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resources that differ in their carbon content. We ﬁnd that, when allowing some time between
announcement and implementation of a cap on carbon dioxide emissions, emissions from
non-renewable energy sources increase at the time of announcement. There are two channels
behind this effect. First, since a binding constraint on emissions restricts energy use during
some period of time, more must be extracted during other periods. Second, since low carbon
energy sources are relatively more valuable when the policy is implemented, it is optimal to
conserve them ahead of enforcement. This might induce a switch to high-carbon resources
before the policy is implemented.
1 Introduction
It is common practice among policy makers to give ﬁrms and consumers time to adjust to pro-
posed changes in environmental policies before they are actually enforced. By announcing policy
measures well in advance, ﬁrms are given the opportunity to rethink and reorganize their produc-
tion process – e.g. installing new production and abatement equipment – ahead of enforcement;
consumers, likewise, may take future policies into consideration when deciding on the purchase
of durable goods, for example. Thus, it is generally believed that announcing policy changes may
reduce compliance costs.
It is likely, however, that the effects of policy announcements may be quite different in the con-
text of energy and climate change policy. By increasing the price of (inputs based on) fossil fuels,
climatepolicy shouldinduceﬁrmsandconsumerstosubstituteaway fromfuelsandintermediate
inputs with high carbon content. However, when faced with a lower demand for their products,
fuels suppliers have an incentive to reduce their price. In particular, when the fuels are produced
from non-renewable resources, the owners of carbon-containing resources have an incentive to
lowertheirpricesinanticipationoffutureCO2 reductionmeasures,topreventtheirresourcesfrom
remaining unexploited. As anticipated policy leaves the agents free to emit in the period between
¤We would like to thank Michael Caputo, Emiliya Lazarova, Charles Mason, Nicolas Querou, Heinz Welsch and Cees
Withagen for useful comments and discussions.
†Author for correspondence. E-mail: corrado.dimaria@ucd.ie.
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announcement and implementation, it begs the question how carbon dioxide emissions in this
period respond to the announcement of future climate policy.
Such concerns, however, have not entered the policy makers agendas, and there has been no
attempt to implement climate change policy in an expedite way. The ﬁrst commitment period of
the Kyoto Protocol started on January 1, 2008, when agents had been aware for over ten years that
a policy on greenhouse gas emissions was likely to come into force.
In this paper we study how emissions are affected by such an announcement, in the phase be-
tween the announcement itself and the policy’s implementation. We use a model à la Hotelling
(1931) in which utility is derived from consuming a ﬁnal good (say energy), which is produced us-
ing two non-renewable resources differing in their carbon content (say coal and natural gas). We
abstract from physical capital and focus on the optimal extraction path of the resources and the
associated optimal emission path, following the announcement.
We show that announcement of climate policy induces two forces that might lead to an instan-
taneous increase in emissions. First there is an abundance effect of announcement on emissions,
which stems from the fact that when during some period of time less of a non-renewable resource
can be extracted, more of it must be extracted during other periods. Along the optimal path of
energyconsumption,someofthis’extra’energywillbeconsumedbetweentheinstantsofthepol-
icy’s announcement and implementation. The associated increase in energy consumption in this
interimphasewilltheninduceanincreaseincarbondioxideemissionsattheinstantofannounce-
ment,ifthecarboncontentofenergyusedoesnotfallcomparedtothelaissez-faireeconomy. This
abundance effect occurs independent of the number of resources in the economy.
In the case of multiple resources that differ in their carbon content, there may be an additional
ordering effect from announcement, which increases the expected carbon content of energy use
at announcement. When the resources are perfect substitutes, the composition i.e. the order of
extraction is a matter of indifference in a laissez-faire economy. However, when the economy
faces a binding constraint on emissions during some period of time, it is optimal to save some of
the cleanest fuel for this phase, and mainly use the dirtier resource before the constraint becomes
binding. As a consequence, the ordering of resource extraction changes compared to laissez-faire,
and the expected carbon content of extraction increases in the period between announcement
and implementation. This ordering effect never goes against the abundance effect, and might
lead to a further increase in emissions at the instant of announcement. As the idea underlying
the Kyoto Protocol is to stabilize the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere (Article 2
of the UNFCCC), the announcement effects of climate policy go directly against the spirit of the
policy.
Surprisingly, only few papers study the effects of announced climate policy, and none has stud-
ied the effect of announcement on emissions. Kennedy (2002) and Parry and Toman (2002) focus
on domestic climate policies in the period between announcement and implementation of inter-
national climate policy, and argue that policies aimed at emission reductions in this period may
be costly and inefﬁcient. Kennedy (2002) shows that, given a future ceiling on emissions, addi-
tional policy aimed at emission reductions before the future policy becomes enforced leads to too
low investment in research and development and too much early capital investment, as the latter
lead to immediate emission reductions whereas the former only lead to future emission reduc-
tions. Parry and Toman (2002) show that emission reductions before the commitment phase are
efﬁcient when banking of credits is allowed. This was not the case for the Kyoto Protocol. In this
paper we do not look at additional emission reduction policies and only focus on the effects of
announcement of the climate policy on emissions. Smulders and Van der Werf (2008) study the
effect of climate policy on relative resource extraction when resources are imperfect substitutes
and differ in carbon content, but the authors do not study the policy’s effect on the level of energy
use and the level of emissions.ANNOUNCEMENT EFFECTS OF CLIMATE POLICY 3
The second key element of this paper, the optimal ordering of resource extraction, has been
studied more intensively in the literature, starting with the seminal paper of Herﬁndahl (1967). In
that paper it is shown, in a partial equilibrium context, that when resources only differ in their
extraction cost, it is optimal to extract the lowest-cost resource ﬁrst. Kemp and Long (1980) study
underwhichconditionsthisresultholdsinageneralequilibriummodel. Lewis(1982)extendsthis
to the case in which the resource can be converted in to productive capital, whereas Chakravorty
and Krulce (1994) study heterogenous demand. Amigues, Favard, and Gaudet (1998), in turn, look
at the case of a capacity constraint on the backstop technology.
In the context of climate policy, Chakravorty, Magné, and Moreaux (2006) regard a ceiling on
the stock of emissions, and show that in the case of one polluting resource and a clean backstop
technology,thetwoinputsmightbeusedjointlyduringtheconstraintphase,eventhoughtheyare
perfect substitutes. This analysis is extended to the case of two, perfectly substitutable resources
that differ in carbon content, in Chakravorty, Moreaux, and Tidball (2008), who ﬁnd that the or-
dering of resource extraction is not strictly dictated by carbon content. However, both studies
disregard announcement effects.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. After we have introduced the model in section
2, we study the optimal path of energy consumption of an economy that never faces regulation
(the laissez-faire economy). We then show in section 4 how announcement of climate policy leads
to an abundance effect that induces an increase in energy use at the instant of announcement,
which, when abstracting from ordering effects, leads to an increase in emissions. In section 5
we show under which conditions the two resources are abundant, and in section 6 we study the
relative scarcity of the two resources. We then study how this affects the ordering of extraction
after announcement. Section 8 shows how the abundance effect and the changes in the order of
resource extraction affect optimal emission paths. We conclude in section 9.
2 The model
We study the optimal response of consumers, producers, and resource owners to an (announced)
ceiling on the ﬂow of carbon dioxide emissions. A high-carbon nonrenewable resource, H, and
a low-carbon one, L, are perfect substitutes in the production of output R (electricity, say). The
use of one unit of i 2 {H,L}, entails the emission of "i units of carbon dioxide, Z, with "H È "L.
The economy faces a constraint on the ﬂow of CO2 emissions, Z · ¯ Z, at some exogenously set and
known point in the future, T ¸0.
Consumers derive utility from energy consumed. They maximize utility U(R), which is a C 2
function such that U0 È 0 and U00 Ç 0. Producers and resource owners maximize proﬁts, taking
prices and policies as given. Since there are no market failures in our model (as we study cost-
effective rather than optimal climate policy), the decentralized economy can be represented by
the social planner’s solution in which utility is maximized subject to the technology, resource and








˙ SH(t)Æ¡RH(t), RH(t)¸0, SH(0)ÆSH0; (1.c)
˙ SL(t)Æ¡RL(t), RL(t)¸0, SL(0)ÆSL0; (1.d)
Z(t)´"HRH(t)Å"LRL(t)· ¯ Z 8t ¸T. (1.e)
Ri(t) denotes extraction of nonrenewable i at time (t), and ½ is the rate of time preference. Equa-
tions (1.c) and (1.d) show that the stock Si of each nonrenewable declines with extraction. TheANNOUNCEMENT EFFECTS OF CLIMATE POLICY 4
initial endowment of each resource, Si0, i 2{H,L}, is given. Throughout the paper, both the stocks
and the extraction ﬂows of the resources are expressed in units of energy.
Climate policy is described in (1.e): emissions (Z) arise from resource use, but from time T on
they are constrained not to exceed ¯ Z. The fact that the policy is announced at the beginning of the
planninghorizonbutonlybecomeseffectivewithalagconstitutesthekeyingredientofourmodel.
Thisentailsthedivisionoftheplanninghorizonintwophases: aﬁrstperiodwhentheconstraintis
not yet enforced (the interim phase), and a second period when the constraint is enforced and (at
least initially) binding (the enforcement phase). The problem in (1.a)-(1.e) is therefore an inﬁnite-
horizon discounted two-stage optimal control problem, with a ﬁxed switching time at t ÆT.























where superscript 1 indicates the Lagrangian for the period t 2 [0,T), while 2 indicates the La-
grangian for t ¸ T. The ¸i’s are the co-state variables associated to (1.c) and (1.d), the °i’s the
multipliers for the nonnegativity constraints on the extraction rates, and ¿ is the multiplier asso-
ciated with the emission constraint.












where i 2{H,L} and j 2{1,2}, need to be complemented by the following matching conditions for
the co-state variables in the two stages:
¸1
i (T ¡)Æ¸2
i (T Å). (6)
This guarantees the continuity of the co-state variables at the time of the switch. To simplify nota-
tion, in what follows we drop the superscripts to the ¸’s.
The complementary slackness conditions for the constraints are,




Æ0, 8t ¸T; (7)
°
j
i (t)¸0, Ri(t)¸0, °
j
i (t)Ri(t)Æ0; (8)




3 The laissez-faire economy
Aslongastheconstraintneverbinds,environmentalpolicyhasnoinﬂuenceontheagent’schoices.
For this reason, we refer to this benchmark case as the laissez-faire economy.
Since the two resources are perfect substitutes as sources of utility, the two non-renewables are
de facto identical as long as their carbon content is irrelevant, and can be treated as one. For an
1In the interest of compactness, and with a slight abuse of notation, we have indicated the necessary conditions for
the two stages as one. Note that ¿(t)Æ0 for all t ÇT.ANNOUNCEMENT EFFECTS OF CLIMATE POLICY 5
economy that is never constrained, we can then deﬁne the total stock of available resources (in
energy units) at time t as S(t)´SH(t)ÅSL(t), and the initial total stock as S(0)´S0.
Along the optimal extraction path, marginal utility grows in parallel with the scarcity rent ¸ at
rate½,ascanbeseenfrom(4)and(5). Ateachpointintimetotalextractionequalsenergydemand,
and is simply given by R(t) Æ d(¸(t)) ´ U0¡1(¸(t)). Thus, extraction is continuous and declines
along the optimal path.
From (5) and (9) follows that it is not optimal to leave any of the resource in the ground, hence






dt Æ S0, so that ¸0 is a function of S0, ¸0 Æ ¤(S0). Hence, the larger the initial
(total) resource stock, the lower ¸0, and the higher initial extraction (see (4)). In the laissez-faire
economy, optimal extraction proﬁles are purely determined by the initial scarcity of the resource,




Since the two resources are identical as long as their carbon content does not matter, the exact
composition of extraction is undetermined, and so is energy’s carbon intensity.
4 Optimal energy demand and policy announcements: the abundance
effect
Suppose the emission constraint (1.e) were introduced without announcement, that is let T Æ 0.
Then, provided the constraint is binding for some period, less of the resources can be extracted
during this phase, compared to the laissez-faire extraction path. As a consequence, more of the
resource is available after the constraint becomes slack (at time TH, say) than would otherwise
have been the case. In order for both stocks to be exhausted over time, extraction during this
period needs to be larger than under laissez-faire.
When the policy is announced ahead of enforcement (i.e. T È0), instead, the agents realize that
the amount of resource that cannot be extracted during the constrained period, can be extracted
not only after the constraint ceases to be binding, but also before the policy becomes enforced,
i.e. in the interim phase. The resource aggregate thus becomes de facto more abundant already
during the interim phase. Consequently, it is optimal to increase the amount of energy consumed
in the (0,T) interval, compared to the laissez-faire situation. This is, in a nutshell, the essence of
the abundance effect:
Proposition 1 (The Abundance Effect). Suppose an emission constraint is announced at t Æ0 and
becomes binding at t ÆT È0. Then, resource use jumps up at the instant of announcement.
Proof. By deﬁnition of a binding emissions constraint, U(R(T)) ÇU(e R(T)) implying R(T) Ç e R(T).
Thus, over some strictly positive time interval, R(t) Ç e R(t). From (9), it then follows that during
other periods R(t)È e R(t).
From (5), marginal utility grows at rate ½ during all unconstrained phases along any optimal path.
Thus if U0(R(t))e¡½t ? U0(e R(t))e¡½t for some t 2 {(0,T),[TH,1)}, the same holds for all t in the
same interval.
Resource extraction has to be continuous at TH or the Hamiltonian in (2) would be discontinuous,
which cannot be optimal. Finally, R(T) Ç e R(T); thus, it must be the case that R(t) È e R(t), 8t 2
{(0,T),[TH,1)}, to satisfy the transversality conditions (9).
From the necessary conditions, we know that the optimal path entails constant discounted
marginal utility across all phases during which the economy is unconstrained – see (4) and (5).
Hence the amount of the resource that comes available outside the constrained period due to the
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Figure 1: Extraction paths for the laissez-faire economy – dashed line – and for the economy with an
announced emissions constraint – solid line.
An interesting aspect of the abundance effect is that at the instant of implementation (t Æ T),
extraction (and hence utility) jumps down relative to the laissez-faire situation. This might be
surprising since one might expect that risk-averse consumers would smooth their consumption
over time, knowing in advance of the binding constraint. Consumption is smoothed wherever
possible. Only at time T consumption discretely drops and marginal utility jumps up. However,
thiscannotbeavoidedsinceanyreallocationofconsumptiontowardstheperiodjustafter T (with
relatively high marginal utility) would result in violation of the emission constraint.
Figure1comparestheextractionpathsinthelaissez-faireeconomyandintheeconomywithan
announcedconstraint,forthespecialcaseinwhichallresourceshavethesameemissionintensity,
or –equivalently– in which there is only one resource (note that the result in Proposition 1 holds
for any number of resources, possibly with different carbon intensities). The level of extraction in
the constrained economy is higher than under laissez-faire both before implementation at time
T, and after t ÆTX, the instant at which laissez-faire emissions drop below ¯ Z.
From the proposition immediately follows that
Corollary 1. Keeping emissions per unit of energy constant, the announcement of climate policy
leads to an increase in emissions.
Announcingclimate policy leads to a perverse increase in emissions at the instant of announce-
ment,iftheemissionsintensityofenergyproductiondoesnotfall. Notethatthepointmadeinthe
corollary can be strengthened: as Proposition 1 states that energy use increases, so does the level
of emissions, unless the carbon intensity of energy falls proportionally more than the increase in
energy use.
In a setting with multiple resources, this emissions intensity is determined by the order, or com-
position,ofextraction. Inthefollowingsectionsweinvestigatethecaseoftworesourcesthatdiffer
intheircarboncontenttostudywhetherourcœterisparibus assumptionofconstantemissionsin-
tensity holds in the case of multiple resources. We show that in addition to the abundance effect,
there exists an ordering effect of the announcement on the carbon intensity of energy. As the op-
timal extraction paths are sensitive to initial conditions, however, it is ﬁrst necessary to present a






















Figure 2: A taxonomy of initial stocks
5 Deﬁning absolute abundance
The previous section described the abundance effect of an announced emissions constraint: pro-
vided that the constraint is binding for some time, energy consumption jumps up at the instant
of announcement. For the constraint to be binding, however, it must be the case that initially so
much of the resource is available that along a laissez-faire extraction path, more carbon dioxide
would be emitted than allowed by the constraint. Hence, the abundance effect is directly linked to
the initial absolute abundance of resources.
Wenowcharacterizeresourceendowmentssuchthatagivenconstraintwillbebindingforsome
periodoftime,andtheabundanceeffectoccurs. Theseareinitialresourcestockssuchthatlaissez-
faire extraction paths violate the emission constraint. By identifying all endowments such that a
laissez-faire extraction path will leave the economy unconstrained, we obtain a contrario those
that lead to an abundance effect.
To begin with, assume that the cap ¯ Z is immediately binding, i.e. let T Æ 0. In this case, it is
possible to identify the largest stock of each type of resource i 2{H;L} such that, if it were the only
resource in the economy, its extraction leads to a path that is never constrained by a given ceiling
on emissions ¯ Z. Such a stock, which we denote by Sh
i , must be such that the associated optimal
extraction path satisﬁes "i e R(0;Sh
i ) Æ ¯ Z; i.e. the constraint is exactly binding at t Æ 0, and never
again. Sincethesecorrespondtothelargestpossiblestocksofeachresourcethatmaybeextracted
along an unconstrained (single-resource) path when the constraint is immediately enforced, we
call these the maximal Hotelling stocks. Notice that e R(0;Sh
i ) Æ ¯ Z/"i ´ ¯ Ri is the maximum amount
of i that can be extracted when the emission constraint is binding. For future use, it is useful to
denote price associated with ¯ Ri by ¯ pi ÆU0( ¯ Ri). From the properties ofU and the fact that "H È"L,
it follows that ¯ pH È ¯ pL. Finally, since the emission coefﬁcient determines the amount of resource
thatcanbe used atthe ceiling, thecleanertheresource, thelargerthemaximal Hotellingstock, i.e.
Sh
L ÈSh
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These deﬁnitions are useful to identify initial endowments that lead to an unconstrained path
when T Æ 0. We refer to Figure 2, which has stocks of the low-carbon resource on the abscissa,
and stocks of the high-carbon on the ordinate, both expressed in units of energy rather than in
physical units.2 We begin by indicating the maximal Hotelling stocks in the ﬁgure. When stocks
are at point A Æ(0,Sh
H), extraction equals ¯ RH, the price is ¯ pH, and the path of extraction is uncon-
strainedfromtheinstantatwhichstocksareinpoint A onwards. Next,focusontheiso-energyline
throughC Æ(Sh
L,0), whichdenotes all vectorssuchthat SH(t)ÅSL(t)ÆSh
L. The economy is uncon-
strained at point C by deﬁnition of maximal Hotelling stock. However, moving up along this line
from point C, the carbon content of the vector of stocks increases. As a consequence, if initial de-
mand (equal to ¯ RL) were satisﬁed using only the high-carbon source, emissions would exceed the
cap. To avoid excessive emissions, enough of the low-carbon resource must be extracted at each
point in time in combination with the high-carbon resource until the iso-energy line through A is
reached and total stocks equal SH
h . This requires a minimum amount of the low-carbon resource
to be available initially. Along the iso-energy line through point C (i.e. when the total stock equals
Sh
L), the minimum amount of low-carbon needed along an unconstrained path is SL
m (which is
deﬁned in appendix A), so that wherever initial stocks are on line segment BC, extraction is un-
constrained. Starting from an iso-energy line with smaller total stock than Sh
L, unconstrained ex-
traction is lower and correspondingly lower amounts of low-carbon resources are needed to make
the unconstrained extraction path compatible with the emissions constrained. For any given total
stock (i.e. along a particular iso-energy line), we can identify the minimum L-stock and the corre-
sponding maximum H-stock. For S0 2 (Sh
H,Sh
L) this is represented by AB. In Appendix A we show
that along the trajectory AB, emissions exactly equal ¯ Z, and the price of energy increases from ¯ pL
to ¯ pH, as more and more RH is used. Thus, when the vector of stocks is within the OABC area, the
emission constraint is never binding, and we can state the following:
Lemma 1. When stocks are in area OABC of Figure 2, the economy is unconstrained along an opti-
mal extraction path.
Proof. See Appendix A.
When the policy is announced ahead of implementation, i.e. when T È 0, the possibility arises
that during the interim phase some of the resources can be extracted without violating the con-
straint. Thus, in the presence of an announced constraint, the set of endowment vectors consis-
tentwithunconstrainedpathsislargerthantheareaidentiﬁedabove. Thekeyissueiswhether,for
a given level of the constraint ¯ Z, the vector of resource endowments lies within OABC at time T.
Deﬁne by ±H(T) the largest cumulative extraction of the dirty fuel that can be performed in the in-
terimphaseofanunconstrainedpathentailingtheextractionof H only. Sincethepriceofthedirty
inputatthebeginningoftheconstrainedperiodcannotbebelow ¯ pH –thepricethatcharacterizes
themaximalHotellingpath–thesizeof±H(T)onlydependsonthedurationoftheinterimperiod,
and is given by ±H(T) Æ
R T
0 d( ¯ pH e¡½(T¡t))dt. In the same way, for ±L(T) – the largest cumulative
extraction of the clean fuel that can be carried out in the interim phase of an unconstrained path
entailing the extraction of L only – we have ±L(T) Æ
R T
0 d( ¯ pLe¡½(T¡t))dt. In terms of Figure 2, ±H
is represented by the vertical distance between A and A0, whereas ±L is the horizontal distance
betweenC and D.
Let the vectors S0 Æ {SL(0),SH(0)} identify initial levels of the stock of resources. Recalling from
section 3 that the optimal unconstrained extraction path associated with an initial total stock of





Ri(t)Æ e R(t;S0)8t \
X
i
"iRi(t0)· ¯ Z 8t0 ÈT}. (10)
2Given this convention, lines with negative unit slope are iso-energy lines.ANNOUNCEMENT EFFECTS OF CLIMATE POLICY 9
The following result relates the deﬁnition above to the graphical representation in Figure 2:
Lemma 2. The set H is represented by the area OA0B0D in Figure 2.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Thus, only initial endowments outside the set H can be considered abundant, in the sense that
any path starting from such endowments will be constrained by climate policy. We can conclude
that any initial endowment outside of set H will be subject to the abundance effect brought about
by the announcement of the policy. Formally,
Proposition2. Any path beginning from a vector of initial stocks S0 62H will be subject to the abun-
dance effect.
Proof. It immediately follows from the deﬁnition in (10) and Lemma 2.
6 Relative scarcity and optimal extraction
Since the clean fuel allows more energy to be consumed during the constrained phase, agents
prefer to conserve it for the enforcement phase. When L is available only in small amounts, it is
attractivetouseonlythedirtyfuelintheinterimperiod, sothatallofthecleanoneisstillavailable
whenenforcementstarts. However,whenenoughofthecleanfuelisavailablefromthestart,itcan
be used already in the interim period, and still leave enough of it available for use at the time of
enforcement.
If this intuition is correct, the introduction of an announced binding constraint has different
effects on the relative scarcity of the two resources, depending on the initial endowment of each
resource. Asaﬁrststep,weshowthattheconstraintnevermakesthehigh-carbonresourcescarcer
than the low-carbon one:
Lemma 3. If the emissions constraint is binding for some period of time, then ¸H(t) · ¸L(t) 8t
along any optimal extraction path.
Proof. First, notice that if the cap is binding at time t, then ¿(t) ¸ 0. Now suppose that ¸H È ¸L.
From the necessary conditions (4) we must have: (i) if ¿ Æ 0, only L is used; or (ii) if ¿ È 0, then
pH È pL, and again only L is used. Hence, H is never used, which, given (5), violates (9). Hence we
must have ¸H(t)·¸L(t)8t.
Thus,thescarcityrentofthedirtierresourceneverexceedstherentofthecleanerone. However,
the optimal extraction path during the unconstrained phases will be very different depending on
whether ¸H is equal to, or strictly smaller than ¸L: in the latter case, only the cheaper, dirtier
fuel will be extracted during these phases. We now show how initial endowments determine the
optimal extraction paths in the presence of announced climate policy. For ease of reference we
draw these paths in Figure 3, for initial stocks characterized by the same total energy content. The
proofs behind this Figure and the discussion below can be found in Appendix B.
6.1 Equal scarcity rents
Scarcity rents are equal when welfare cannot be improved by (marginally) changing initial endow-
ments, replacing one unit of one resource by one unit of the other. This indifference situation
arises, as we will now show, if the initial stock of L is large enough, while that of H is not too large.


























Figure 3: Initial endowments and optimal extraction paths.
The optimal time path of extraction is as shown in Figure 1. The initial stock is too large to make
an unconstrained path feasible, so extraction has to be capped from T to TH. Now consider what
happens when both resources are available. It is easy to see that the same path of total extraction
(and thus the same welfare level) can be realized when the total energy stock is the same but (a
sufﬁciently small) part of it is made up of the high-carbon resource. In particular, H could be ex-
tracted without problems once R falls below ¯ RH, as the cap does not bind any more then. Even
when total energy use is comprised between ¯ RH and ¯ RL, however, H can be used to some extent,
and still not violate the pollution constraint. More precisely, in the period after the constrained
phase, i.e. after time TH, an amount of H up to Sm
H can be used (see Lemma 2 and Figure 2).
This discussion allows us to deﬁne formally zone I as SI ´ {S0 : S0 62 H \ SH0 Ç Sm
H}, which
elucidates that initial endowments in this zone are abundant in absolute terms such that the cap
will bind at least over some period of time – the total stock is outside H. However, the initial stock
of the high-carbon fuel is small enough not to represent a constraint to extraction. Therefore, the
cleaner resource L is not scarce relative to H, and hence ¸H Æ¸L.
Along paths starting in zone I, from point L in Figure 3 say, the economy is constrained from
time T until the instant when the path enters area OABC. During the constrained phase, only the
low-carbon input is used in order to maximize energy supply (remember that ¯ RL È ¯ RH). Since the
low-carbon input is very abundant, there is no need to save on it during the interim phase. Since
¸H Æ ¸L, the composition of extraction during the interim phase is a matter of indifference, thus
the path drawn in the picture is only one of the inﬁnitely many possible ones.
Besides after TH, extraction of H is of course also possible when the cap is not yet enforced, i.e.
during the interim period. This allows for an expansion of the possible set of initial endowments
such that scarcity rents are equal beyond zone I. Consider point M which has the same initial
amount of aggregate energy as point L. From M it is thus possible to extract the same amount
of energy that is optimal to extract when starting at point L, and end up in zone I before the cap
is enforced. After that, aggregate extraction along both paths can clearly be the same. Since at
most Sm
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initially at points above zone I, it must be optimal to reduce this stock to at least Sm
H before the
cap is enforced. How much of H can be extracted along the optimal path ahead of the constrained
phase, however, dependsonhowmuchof L is initially available, asshowninAppendixB. Foreach
level of SL0, we can identify an upper bound on SH0, which we denote by e SH in Figure 2, such that
Sm
H can be reached before time T.
Fromthisdiscussion,wecandeﬁnezone II asSII ´{S0 :S0 62H\SL0 ÈSm
L \SH0 2(Sm
H, e SH(SL0)]}.
When initial stocks are in this zone, the dirty resource is relatively more abundant than in zone I
and restricts the composition of extraction before the cap is enforced as described above. At the
same time, the initial stock of H is small enough so that there is no need to use it exclusively be-
fore the cap is enforced: mixed use is still optimal, and ¸L(t) Æ ¸H(t). Thus e SH(SL0) indicates the
border between areas where the clean resource is abundant (zones I and II) and those where it is
relatively scarce (zones III and IV ).
To summarize, when S0 2 SII, the optimal extraction paths are similar to zone I: initially the
composition of extraction is indeterminate, provided that enough H is extracted to reach SI at t ·
T; during the constrained phase only the low-carbon resource is used; ﬁnally, the composition of
extraction is again indeterminate once OABC is reached and the constraint ceases to be binding.
In Figure 3, we draw one of the many possible paths starting from M.
6.2 Different scarcity rents
Initial endowments in zones III (deﬁned as SIII ´ {S0 : S0 62 H \ SL0 È Sm
L \ SH0 È e SH(SL0)}) and
IV (where SIV ´ {S0 : S0 62 H \ SL0 Ç Sm
L }) are characterized by a relatively scarce clean resource.
Alongpathsstartingfromthesezones, scarcityrentsarenolongerequal, insteadwehave ¸H Ç¸L.
This implies, from the ﬁrst-order conditions (4), that whenever the constraint is not binding (i.e.
as long as ¿Æ0) only the high-carbon content fuel will be used.
For simplicity, we begin with paths originating from zone IV (point P in Figure 3). In this case,
thelow-carboninputisscarce,inthesensethatitsendowmentistoosmalltowarrantitsexclusive
useduringtheconstrainedphase. Still,sinceitistheinputthatgivesthehighestamountofenergy
per unit of carbon, it is optimal to conserve as much as possible of it during the interim phase,
hence in this phase only the high-carbon resource is used. At the beginning of the constrained
phase, both fuels are used jointly until L is exhausted. For the rest of the constrained phase the
dirty input is used at its maximum rate ¯ RH. Finally, when the trajectory of stocks enters OABC at
point A, the constraint ceases to bind, and extraction of H proceeds to exhaustion.
When S0 2 SIII, the extraction paths are similar to the ones discussed above: trajectories from
initial stocks in zone III eventually enter zone IV and follow the path described above. Prior to
entering zone IV , the optimal path is already constrained and only the clean fuel is extracted at
the cap. In the interim phase it is optimal to save L and extract only H. Paths of this type are
illustrated by the path starting from point N in Figure 3.
7 The ordering effect of an announced constraint
In section 4 we have shown that announcement of a constraint on the ﬂow of emissions shifts
extraction to the period before implementation if the total initial stock of resources is abundant
enough to make the emissions constraint binding. In the previous section we have shown how the
initial composition of the resource stock affects the composition and order of extraction. If ini-
tially the low-carbon resource is scarce relative to the total stock, announcement shifts extraction
(partially, or – in case of unequal scarcity rents – completely) to the high-carbon resource in the
interim period. In this case the announced constraint exerts what we will call an ordering effect.ANNOUNCEMENT EFFECTS OF CLIMATE POLICY 12
7.1 The extreme ordering effect
Depending on initial endowments, the ordering effect occurs with different intensity. When initial
stocks are in zone III or IV , total energy reserves are large and mainly consist of the high-carbon
fuel. The large total stock provides the incentive to consume a lot during the interim phase. The
relative scarcityofthelow-carbonstockmakesitoptimaltomaintainthesehighenergyconsump-
tion levels without using the low-carbon fuel; L is indeed more valuable in the constrained period
as it allows more energy consumption at the capped pollution level. As shown in section 6.2, the
policy announcement makes the scarcity rent of low carbon resources exceed that of high carbon
ones, hence it becomes optimal to extract only the high-carbon resource in the interim phase. We
thus observe the ordering effects in its extreme form:
Proposition 3 (The Extreme Ordering Effect). Suppose an emission constraint is announced at
t Æ0 and becomes binding at t ÆT È0. Then, whenever S0 2SIII [SIV , it is optimal to extract only
the high-carbon resource 8t 2[0,T).
Proof. As shown in Appendix B, paths initiated in zones III and IV are characterized by ¸H Ç¸L.
It follows from (4) and (8) that whenever ¿Æ0, RH È0, and RL Æ0.
The extreme ordering effect compounds the abundance effect in countering the intended out-
come of the regulation in the interim phase: not only does resource use increase, it also becomes
biased towards the most polluting fuel.
7.2 The weak ordering effect
Proposition 3 shows that for initial endowments in zone III or IV , the announcement induces an
extreme ordering effect, as optimality requires that only the high-carbon input be extracted in the
interim phase. On the other hand, section 6.1 shows that for initial endowments in zone I, the pol-
icy announcement does not make the clean resource relatively scarce (rents are equal for the two
resources): enough of the clean resource is available (relative to the stock of the other resource)
to allow exclusive use of it in the interim period and yet conserve enough for the constrained pe-
riod. Therefore, just as in the laissez-faire economy, the ordering and composition of resource
extraction are undetermined in the interim phase.
Between these two extremes, we ﬁnd paths that start from zone II. Based on our discussion in
section6.1,weknowthatforsuchpaths,althoughthescarcityrentsareequalized,L isnevertheless
scarceenoughtodictateapreciserequirementforextraction: optimalityrequiresthepathtoenter
zone I by time t ÆT. This restriction imposes a lower bound on the amount of H that needs to be
extracted in the interim phase, and de facto introduces an ordering effect, albeit in a weaker form
than the one discussed in Proposition 3. Since L is not scarce enough to univocally determine
the extraction path (as ¸h Æ ¸L, see section 6.1), however, such weak ordering effect can only be
analyzed in terms of expected, rather than actual, carbon intensity.
To see what the weak ordering effect entails, we now refer to Figure 4.
Consider any pointQ in zone II. As discussed in section 3, under laissez-faire the exact compo-
sition of extraction at any point in time is indeterminate. Hence, the actual extraction path fromQ
for t 2[0,T) can evolve in any direction within the quadrant to the South-West of the initial point.
Assuming that any of these paths is equally likely, the ‘expected’ extraction path is given by the
bisector of the SW quadrant (i.e. the dashed 45± vector to the SW fromQ).
With announced climate policy, instead, the optimal extraction path originating from Q must
enter zone I before the enforcement of the cap. This means that at least an amount of H equal
to the vertical distance between Q and the horizontal Sm


























Figure 4: Feasible paths during the interim phase for initial stocks in zone II.
to be extracted in the interim phase. Given that the total amount of energy that can be extracted
during the interim phase is given by wx (the vertical distance between point w, where the iso-
energy line through Q crosses the e SH locus, and the Sm
H line), at most xy of the clean input can
be extracted before time T. Although it is impossible to be more precise as to which path will
actually be followed, the composition of extraction will range from 100% H, along the vector
¡ !
Qz,
to the path with the lowest carbon content, along
¡ !
Qx. The expected extraction path in this case it
given by the bisector of the angle  xQz, as depicted in the Figure. Notice that the range of possible
optimal trajectories from Q after the announcement is reduced relative to laissez-faire; moreover,
the trajectories that are not feasible are the ones with the lowest carbon content. Hence, we can
conclude that the weak ordering effect induced by the announcement raises the carbon intensity
of extraction during the interim phase, at least in expectations.
Proposition 4 (The Weak Ordering Effect). Suppose an emission constraint is announced at t Æ
0 and becomes binding at t Æ T È 0. Then, whenever S0 2 SII, the expected carbon intensity of
extraction in the interim phase increases, relative to laissez-faire.
Proof. In the text above.
Finally, it is worth pointing out that, while the weak ordering effect operates everywhere in zone
II, its impact is weaker, the lower the carbon content of initial stocks. Along any iso-energy line,
initial endowments closer to zone I will be subject to a weaker ordering effect. This is illustrated
in Figure 4 by point Q0. For initial stocks in Q0, the range of possible paths is much larger than for
pointQ, since only a small amount of H needs to be extracted in the interim phase.
8 Announced policy and emissions
In section 4 we have shown that, irrespective of the number and carbon content of resources, en-
ergy use jumps up at the instant at which a future binding constraint on emissions is announced.
This leads to an increase in emissions if the carbon content of energy extraction doesn’t fall tooANNOUNCEMENT EFFECTS OF CLIMATE POLICY 14
much according to Corollary 1. We can now combine these results with the ones derived above on
the ordering – and hence the carbon content – of extraction.
First, for initial stocks in zone I, we know that the abundance effect operates (Proposition 2),
butthereisnoorderingeffectatwork. Althoughwecannotsayanythingspeciﬁcintermsofactual
extraction paths, there is no reason to expect that the announcement would affect the ordering of
extraction compared to the laissez-faire economy. Thus, we expect that emissions increase at the
instant of announcement.
When initial stocks are in zone II, the abundance effect is compounded by the weak ordering
effect of Proposition 4. Given that the level of energy use increases following the policy announce-
ment, and that the expected carbon intensity increases as well, we expect emissions to increase
in the interim phase also in this case. Since the strength of the ordering effect increases with the
proximity to the boundary between zone II and III (e S(SL0) in Figure 4), our degree of conﬁdence
in this results also increases for endowments closer to zone III.
Finally, for initial stocks in zones III and IV , any ambiguity is resolved. For such initial endow-
ments, Propositions 1 and 3 both imply that emissions increase in the interim phase. Not only
does the level of extraction increase due to the abundance effect, but all of this extraction is made
up of the most polluting resource due to the extreme ordering effect. Going strongly against the
spirit of the regulation, emissions increase in the interim phase due to the policy announcement.
We summarize this discussion in the following proposition:
Proposition 5. Suppose an emission constraint is announced at t Æ 0 and becomes binding at t Æ
T È0. Then, during the interim phase,
1. 8 S0 2SI, energy use increases due to the abundance effect, and emissions per unit of energy
are expected not to be affected, leading to an increase in expected emissions;
2. 8 S0 2SII, energy use increases due to the abundance effect, and emissions per unit of energy
are expected to increase, leading to an increase in expected emissions;
3. 8 S0 2SIII [SIV , energy use increases due to the abundance effect, and emissions per unit of
energy increase, leading to an increase in emissions.
9 Discussion and conclusions
The purpose of climate policy under the UNFCCC is the “...stabilization of greenhouse gas con-
centrationsintheatmosphereatalevelthatwouldpreventdangerousanthropogenicinterference
withtheclimatesystem.” (Article2,UNFCCC)Projectionsoffutureemissionpathsforgreenhouse
gases all indicate that without emissions reduction policy, this goal will not be reached. An impor-
tant means to reduce total greenhouse gas emissions is to reduce carbon dioxide emissions from
the use of fossil fuels. Since fossil fuels are in essence nonrenewable resources, and since the
owners of these resources would like to sell their entire resource stocks over time, this means that
resource extraction has to be postponed relative to a laissez-faire economy.
In this paper we have shown that, although policy makers have good reasons to announce cli-
mate policies in advance – for example to reduce the burden of adjustment to ﬁrms – such an
announcement has effects on CO2 emissions that go against the spirit of the regulation.
When climate policy is announced, an abundance effect occurs, which increases the demand
for energy at the time of announcement. We have shown that energy demand exceeds the laissez-
faire’s level until the constraint becomes binding: since a (binding) ceiling on carbon emissions
implies that less energy is extracted over some time interval relative to the unconstrained case,ANNOUNCEMENT EFFECTS OF CLIMATE POLICY 15
more of it has to be extracted in other periods, including the period between the policy’s an-
nouncement and its implementation (the interim phase). As a consequence, if energy’s carbon
intensity does not fall enough during this phase, carbon emissions will be higher than in the ab-
sence of regulation.
Whether the carbon content of extraction changes during the interim phase, depends on the
relative extraction of high- and low-carbon resources. We have shown that whenever the low-
carboninputisrelativelyscarce,onlythehigh-carboninputisusedduringtheinterimphase. This
is what we call the extreme ordering effect. When the low-carbon input is (relatively) less scarce, a
weak ordering effect occurs, leading to an expected carbon content during the interim phase that
is lower than its maximum level, but strictly higher than the expected carbon content of energy
use in the laissez-faire economy. Finally, when the low-carbon input is not relatively scarce, no
ordering effect materializes, and the expected emissions intensity is the same as under laissez-
faire. Itshouldbenotedthatanorderingeffectalsooccurswhenthetworesourcesareimperfectly
substitutable (see Smulders and Van der Werf, 2008).
A quick look at the data suggests that our propositions might have important consequences for
future policies. As major emitters like the United States and China might at some point in time
decide to restrict their carbon dioxide emissions, this might have a signiﬁcant effect on resource
rents due to the scale of these countries. In these countries, as well as at the global level, the low-
carbon input is indeed relatively scarce: the ratio of proved reserves of coal and natural gas is 22:1
intheUS,35:1inChina,andabitlessthan3:1atagloballevel.3 Bythesheerabundanceofsuchan
high-carbon input as coal, the announcement of a future ceiling on emissions by these countries
might then induce an increase in the relative scarcity rent of gas, and substitution towards coal
before the emission ceiling is enforced. Indeed, several simulation studies have shown that with
strict climate policy, the scarcity rent of coal drops sharply (see e.g. Chakravorty, Roumasset, and
Tse, 1997).
As the abundance effect is always present when the total resource stock is abundant, and since
it is compounded by a higher expected carbon intensity of energy use whenever the low-carbon
input is relatively scarce, climate policy might lead to an adverse increase in emissions in the pe-
riod between announcement and implementation, thus accelerating global warming. That is, an-
nouncement of a policy to stabilize concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere might
have beneﬁcial economic effects by reducing the burden of the policy, but might have environ-
mental results that go directly against the policy’s ultimate target. Our results therefore suggest
that there is a trade-off with respect to climate policy: reducing costs of compliance through pre-
announcement of the policy, versus the environmental risk that this will increase carbon dioxide
emissions. Recognizing the existence of this trade-off has consequences for countries that do not
yet face binding carbon dioxide emission targets: the risk of inducing an increase in emissions,
should be taken into account.
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A Initial stocks and the abundance effect
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
If, for given initial total resource stock S, we choose the Hotelling path for total extraction, and
ﬁnd it feasible to choose the composition of extraction so that Z Ç ¯ Z, then it must also be opti-
mal to follow such path, since the non-constrained path cannot be worse than any constrained
one. Hence, we only need to prove that the unconstrained (Hotelling) solution is feasible in the
constrained economy if we start in area OABC.
For the unconstrained problem (1.a)-(1.d), we denote the solution of total extraction at time t
when the total stock at time 0 equals S0 by ˜ R(t,S0). Since the problem is time autonomous, we can
also write ˜ R(µ,§) for the solution of total extraction a period of length µ after S Æ ¾ was reached,
i.e. along an unconstrained path and for any t0, we have R(t0Åµ) Æ ˜ R(µ,§) if S(t0) Æ §. Finally, we
deﬁne Sh
i , i ÆL,H, as the solution of ˜ R(0,Sh
i )Æ ¯ Z/"i, i.e. at the time the total stock equals Sh
i , total
unconstrained extraction equals ¯ Z/"i.
1. IfS(t)ÇSh
H (whichisrepresentedbyapointtotheleftoftheiso-energylinethrough A),then
˜ R(t0,S(t)) Ç ¯ Z/"H and Z(t0) Ç ¯ Z for all t0 ¸ t along the Hotelling path. Hence the Hotelling
path is feasible the in constrained economy.
2. If S(t) È Sh
L (which is represented by a point to the right of the iso-energy line through C),
then ˜ R(µ,S(t)) È ¯ Z/"L so Z(t Åµ) È ¯ Z for µ È 0 sufﬁciently small along the Hotelling path.
Hence the Hotelling path is not feasible in the constrained economy.
3. If Sh
L ¸ S(t) ¸ Sh
H (which is represented by any point between or on the iso-energy lines
through A and C), then ¯ Z/"H · ˜ R(µ,S(t)) · ¯ Z/"L for µ È 0 sufﬁciently small. For any R ·
¯ Z/"L, we have Z Æ"LRL Å"H (R ¡RL)· ¯ Z if RL ¸max{0,("HR ¡ ¯ Z)/("H ¡"L)}´Rz
L(R).
Hence, Rz
L(R) is the minimum amount of L needed to ensure Z · ¯ Z when total extraction
equals R, and puts a lower bound on the extraction of L in the constrained economy. Since
RL · R , we note that Rz
L(R) is deﬁned only for R · ¯ Z/"L . Hence, by construction, to make
anunconstrainedextractionpath,withS(t)·Sh
L,compatiblewith Z(t)· ¯ Z,weneedatleast
Rz
L( ˜ R(0,S(t))) of L at any time t. Therefore the minimum amount of L needed over time to
make an unconstrained path that starts with S(t) · Sh





This integral equals zero if S(t)ÇSh
H, since Rz
L Æ0 for R Ç ¯ Z/"L Æ ˜ R(0,Sh
H), but this case was




L( ˜ R(µ,S(t)))dµ ´Sz
L(S(t)),
where tH is the time it takes to reduce the stock from S(t) to Sh
H along an unconstrained
path, i.e. tH solves ˜ R(tH,S(t))Æ ¯ Z/"H.
Thus Sz
L(S) is the minimum amount of L needed to make the unconstrained extraction path
feasible in the constrained economy, when starting from a total stock S. The corresponding
maximum amount of H is then Sz
H(S)ÆS¡Sz
L(S). Now it follows immediately that the min-
imum L and maximum H that are needed to ensure a Hotelling path with total resources
S 2[Sh
H,Sh








0(S) Æ ("L ˜ R(0,S)¡ ¯ Z)/("H ˜ R(0,S)¡ ¯ Z) , so that the slopes of AB in points A andANNOUNCEMENT EFFECTS OF CLIMATE POLICY 18
B are given by, respectively, inﬁnity and 0. Hence in point B, ˜ R(t,S0) Æ ¯ RL and p(t) Æ ¯ pL; in
point A, ˜ R(t,S0) Æ ¯ RH and p(t) Æ ¯ pH. Note that in the main text we deﬁne Sm
L as the min-
imum amount of L needed to make the Hotelling path that starts at S Æ Sh
L feasible in the




A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
We are looking for the largest initial stocks, such that if an Hotelling path is followed from t Æ 0,
the pollution constraint is not violated from T onwards. By lemma 1, this implies that stocks at
t Æ T must be on ABC. To allow unconstrained extraction between t Æ 0 and t Æ T, the initial
total stock must equal S(T)Å± such that S(T) is on ABC and ± is cumulative extraction following
Hotelling between t Æ 0 and t Æ T. Let ± solve ± Æ
R T
0 ˜ R(t,S Å±)dt and call the solution ±(S,T).
For any point (SL,SH) on ABC, ±(SL ÅSH,T) represents cumulative extraction along a Hotelling
path over a period of length T that ends with total stock SL ÅSH. The maximal initial stocks are
then represented by A0B0D such that the vertical distance between any point (SL,SH) on ABC and
A0B0D equals ±(SL ÅSH,T). Note that the vertical distance between BC and B0D equals ±(Sh
L,T)´
±L andtheverticaldistancebetween A and A0 equals±(Sh
H,T)´±H. Theverticaldistancebetween
AB and A0B0 increases the more we move to the right since points on AB further to the right are
associated with higher S, and ± increases in S.
B Optimal extraction paths
Lemma B.1. Along any optimal constrained path, ¸L(t)Æ¸H(t) 8t 2[0,1) if and only if SL0 ÈSm
L ,






L )/ ¯ RL¡t]
´
dt.
Proof. Only if: Suppose ¸L(t) Æ ¸H(t). Since S0 Ý H, there exists T Æ [T,TH) such that ¿(t) È 0
8t 2 T , and ¿(t) Æ 0 elsewhere. Since ¸L(t) Æ ¸H(t), then RL(t) Æ ¯ RL and RH(t) Æ 0 8t 2 T , see
(4). From this and lemma 1, it follows that SL(TH) 2 [Sm
L ,Sh
L], and SH(TH) 2 [0,Sm
H]. Since TH È T,
SL0 ÈSm
L .
As SL(TH) 2 [Sm
L ,Sh
L], it follows that 8SL(0) Æ SL0, at most SL0¡Sm
L of L can be extracted during
the interim phase. Thus, this phase lasts at most (SL0 ¡Sm
L )/ ¯ RL periods. Since extraction must
be continuous at TH, it follows that ¸H(TH) Æ ¸L(TH) Æ ¯ pL. From (4) and (5), it follows that the







L )/ ¯ RL¡t]
´
dt,





H], and RH(t)Æ0 8t 2T , it follows that
SH0 Ç e SH(SL0)´Sm
H Å e ±H(SL0).
If: Suppose ¸L È¸H. Assume that both SL0 and SH0 are positive.
We ﬁrst note that then, whenever ¿ Æ 0, we cannot have simultaneous use, see (4), and that we
cannot have a switch from exclusive use of one resource to exclusive use of the other resource
(since it would imply a jump in price and hence in extraction, so that the Hamiltonian becomes
discontinuous). Hence, RL Æ 0 whenever ¿ Æ 0, and all L must be depleted when t 2 T to satisfy
the transversality condition (9).
Second, whenever ¿È0, switching from exclusive use of H to mixed use, and from mixed use to
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• When ¿È0, exclusive use of H use implies R(t)ÆRH(t)Æ ¯ RH. A switch to mixed use implies
either lower pollution (contradicts ¿È0), or higher extraction (violating continuity) or both;
• When ¿ È 0, exclusive use of L use implies R(t) Æ RL(t) Æ ¯ RL. A switch to mixed use implies
eitherhigherpollution(violatingthepollutionconstraint)orlowerextraction(violatingcon-
tinuity) or both.
Third, we note that it cannot be optimal to use L immediately before the economy becomes
unconstrained since any use of L at the cap implies R(t)È ¯ RH, while when ¿(t)Æ0 only H is used,
so that R(t)· ¯ RH and R(t) has to be continuous.
It follows that, when constrained, the economy uses both resources simultaneously until L is
depleted, followed by exclusive use of H, and possibly preceded by exclusive use of L. When
both fuels are used simultaneously, Z Æ ¯ Z and p(t) Æ ¸H(t)Å"H¿(t) Æ ¸L(t)Å"L¿(t), so that
ˆ ¸L Æ ˆ ¸H Æ ˆ ¿ Æ ˆ p Æ ½. Simultaneous use and a binding cap requires that, given a path R(t) of
total extraction, RL(t) Æ Rz
L(R(t)). A price growing at rate ½ implies that R(t) coincides with an
unconstrained path, i.e. R(t) Æ ˜ R(t,¾) for some ¾. Thus, simultaneous use can at most last for
the log( ¯ pL/ ¯ pH)/½ periods, during which the price grows from ¯ pL to ¯ pH and cumulative extraction
is




L . If SL0 È Sm
L , simultaneous use must be preceded by exclusive
use of L (at ¯ RL for (SL0 ¡Sm
L )/ ¯ RL periods) to allow full exploitation of L. We can now calculate
the minimum initial amount of H, given SL0, needed to make the path derived above feasible.
The minimum amount is used when the period of exclusive use of H in the constrained period
is minimized, which requires ¿ approaching 0 at the time L is depleted, which, in turn, requires
¿ approaching 0 when simultaneous use starts. But then, the use of H is, by construction, equal
to e SH(SL0), since this was calculated for exclusive H use between 0 and T and a zero tax after
exclusive use of L.
Hence, we have proven that if ¸L È¸H and SL0 ÈSm
L , we must have SH0 È e SH(SL0). Thus, if S0 Ý
H, SL0 È Sm
L and SH0 Ç e SH(SL0), we cannot have ¸L È ¸H, and, by lemma 3, we must have equal
¸’s. Hence, we have proven that if we are in zone I or II, we must have equal scarcity rents.
Corollary B.1. Any optimal constrained path outside of zones I and II, entails ¸L(t) È ¸H(t) 8t 2
[0,1).
We now have all the necessary elements to prove that the optimal paths look indeed like drawn
in Figure 3.
B.1 Endowments in zone I
For initial endowments in the interior of zone I, ¸H(t) Æ ¸L(t), and optimal paths enter zone
OABC crossing the iso-energy line BC, or hit the abscissa, having exhausted H prior to enforce-
ment. Both in the interim phase, and after the constraint becomes slack, extraction is a mat-
ter of indifference. When the constraint binds, however, ¿(t) È 0 and, from (4), ¸L(t)Å"L¿(t) Ç
¸H(t)Å"H¿(t), thus implying that only L is used in the constrained phase. Hence, the ordering of
extraction is indeterminate 8t 2[0,T)[[TH,1), while only L is used in the constrained phase.
B.2 Endowments in zone II
The path is identical to the previous case, with the notable exception that now the trajectory
must enter zone I before the enforcement phase begins at time T to ensure that the path en-
ters zone OABC crossing the iso-energy line BC, or hit the abscissa, having exhausted H prior
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B.3 Endowments in zone IV
Paths starting from zone IV , ¸H(t) Ç ¸L(t). Thus, it is optimal to extract only H 8t 2 [0,T)[
[TH,1). Since SL0 Ç Sm
L , the phase of simultaneous extraction cannot be preceded by exclusive
use of L (see proof of lemma B.1). Hence, the constrained period begins with an initial phase
of joint extraction at the cap along a trajectory parallel to AB, until L is exhausted. The path is
parallelto AB,sincepath AB representsextractionatthecapwithsimultaneoususeandtheprice,
p, growing at rate ½; these characteristics both apply to an unconstrained path with maximum H
stock (i.e. along AB) and to a constrained path with simultaneous use and unequal ¸’s (see proof
lemma B.1).
L is exhausted as the price reaches ¯ pH, at time Tlh say. Following this, only H is extracted at the
cap until the cap ceases to bind – at point A – and the rest of the path is a pure Hotelling one to
exhaustion.
B.4 Endowments in zone III
For endowments in zone III, ¸H(t) Ç ¸L(t). Thus, in the interim phase only H is extracted. Since
SL0 È Sm
L , the phase of simultaneous extraction must be preceded by exclusive use of L (see proof
of lemma B.1). Once SL0 Æ Sm
L , i.e. once zone IV (or area AA0B0B) is reached from the right,
extractionevolvesalongapathparallelto AB,untilLisdepleted,asalreadyexplainedforzone IV .
The last part of the constrained period entails extraction of only H at the cap, until the constraint
turns slack at point A. The last part is a pure Hotelling path until exhaustion.NOTE DI LAVORO DELLA FONDAZIONE ENI ENRICO MATTEI 
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